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Abstract. The spreading of multicast technology enables the development of group communication and so
dealing with digital streams becomes more and more common over the Internet. Given the flourishing of
security threats, the distribution of streamed data must be equipped with sufficient security guarantees. To
this aim, some architectures have been proposed, to supply the distribution of the stream with guarantees of,
e.g., authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the digital contents. This paper shows a formal capability
of capturing some features of secure multicast protocols. In particular, both the modeling and the analysis of
some case studies are shown, starting from basic schemes for signing digital streams, passing through proto-
cols dealing with packet loss and time-synchronization requirements, concluding with a secure distribution of
a secret key. A process-algebraic framework will be exploited, equipped with schemata for analysing security
properties and compositional principles for evaluating if a property is satisfied over a system with more than
two components.
Keywords: Formal security models and analysis, multicast communication
1. Introduction
Multicast communication and security issues. With the wide use of Internet, the popularity of
multicast technology has grown considerably. Examples include live-broadcasts, digitized audio and video,
news feeds, stock quotes, multi-party video games, multi-party video conferences, data applets, software
updates.
Dealing with multicast communication means, in the terminology currently present in the literature,
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dealing with digital streams, i.e., long (potentially infinite) sequences of bits. The stream is typically sent
from one sender to a set of receivers.
Given that network security threats have flourished as well, the increasing trend to distribute streamed
data over the Internet must be equipped with sufficient security guarantees. In particular, the so called stream
signature protocols were born with the intent of efficiently solving the problem to sign digital streams. This
class of protocols, designed for open architectures, makes usually use of hashing techniques and a thrifty use
of standard digital signatures to ensure the authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the stream.
In some cases, confidentiality requirements are also due, as in a pay per view environment, where only a
restricted group of authorized users must have the ability to consume the stream.
Formal models and verification of secure multicast and secure data streaming. Along
with the development of schemes for secure multicast and secure data streaming, the use of formal tech-
niques for their model and analysis represents an interesting challenge because of the differences of between
such protocols and standard cryptographic schemes. Indeed, two peculiarities are: i) a sender broadcasts
a continuous (and possibly unbounded) stream of messages to a (possibly unbounded) set of receivers; ii)
receivers possibly use information retrieved in earlier packets to legitimate later packets or vice-versa.
Also, from a security point of view, and within a wireless context, the relative ease with which any entity,
supplied with an antenna, may eavesdrop on communication, modify (and drop) messages in transit, inject
new messages on the wireless links, bring new threats and impose new attacks. Thus, attention has been
paid to developing a formal foundation to the modeling and analysis of wireless communication, see e.g.,
[Mer07, MS06, NH06]. In these papers, process calculi and observational theories have been presented, taking
into account aspects like a transmission that spams over a limited area, and it does not reach all nodes in
the network, or the fact that nodes may not transmit and receive at the same time.
The work in [tBLP06] sums up the results towards the use of team automata [Ell97] for the analysis
of security aspects of multicast/broadcast communication. In particular, the one-to-many and one-to-all
communications, which are so typical of multicast and broadcast communications, were captured by team
automata in a native way as synchronizations between the set of component automata constituting a team
automaton.
Focussing on the analysis of streamed data, in [Arc02], Archer states a formal analysis based on model
checking techniques (i.e., checking all the reachable states of a system with respect to the fulfillment of
a certain property) is not feasible. In her opinion, this is because “an infinite state system is required to
represent the inductive relationship between an arbitrary n-th packet and the initial packet”. Instead, she
exploits theorem proving techniques to analyze the basic version of a well known stream authentication
protocol, the TESLA protocol, [PCST01]. On the other hand, in [BL02] Broadfoot and Lowe show their
successful results derived applying model checking techniques on TESLA, motivating, even though informally,
several steps of the analysis. In particular, they have shown how to build a finite model of TESLA, despite of
the possibly unboundedness of the stream of messages (and cryptographic keys) broadcasted by the sender.
Formal methods have been also exploited for analysing a multicast key management scheme, [TJ03].
The authors model the scheme by a relational modeling language and perform the analysis using the Alloy
Analyzer, an automatic simulation tool. The analysis highlights some flaws of the scheme previously unknown.
The AVISPA model checker [AVI] supports the analysis of VoIP security protocols, aiming at providing
confidentiality, message authentication and integrity, and replay protection to data streams, that typically
carry voice datagrams. In particular, [GS07] considers the inter-operation between protocols at different layers
of the VoIP stack, showing that a protocol may be secure when executed in isolation, but the composition
of protocols in different layers may be not.
The analysis approach we are going to use throughout this paper focuses on the verifiability of a system
with an arbitrary number of components (as in the case of stream signature protocols). In particular, some
compositional principles will be applied to the case studies we present. These principles will allow us to
safely compose processes, in such a way that the overall system preserves the security property that each
subsystem separately enjoys.
A compositional approach has also been exploited in [AAJD05], where the authors propose a general
framework for deriving security protocols from simple components, using composition and refinements. They
consider a family of key-exchange protocols, they prove some security properties of two basic protocols (a
standard signature based challenge-response protocol and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol), and
they prove all the family to be correct by composing the correctness proofs of the sub-analyses. In this paper,
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we deal more with multicast and wireless technology and we focus on number of participants rather than on
number of protocols.
Goal of the paper. The goal of this paper is to show the formal capability of capturing security
features of multicast protocols, like sensor networks protocols based on a time synchronization between
senders and receivers and secret communication within a multicast group. Some case studies will be shown,
modeled, and analyzed by exploiting a process-algebraic framework, equipped with schemata for analysing
security properties and compositional principles for evaluating if a property is satisfied over a system with
more than two components.
Process algebras. Process algebras represent an algebraic approach to the study of concurrent pro-
cesses. They are executable languages for the description of distributed systems. They allow both the speci-
fication of the processes and the formulation of statements about them, together with methodologies for the
verification of these statements.
To facilitate a comparison between processes, several notions of behavioral equivalences have been defined
within the algebras. We mainly deal with the notion of weak bisimulation, [Mil89], recalled in the appendix.
Also, two extensions of CCS, the Calculus of Communicating Systems, [Mil89], namely Crypto-CCS and
tCryptoSPA, will be used throughout the paper (their syntax is concisely presented in Appendix A).
Compositional strategy and general schemata for security properties. A compositional
principle gives sufficient conditions to conclude that the composition of two (or more) processes satisfies the
composition of two (or more) properties, provided that the single processes satisfy the single properties. As
an example, such a principle could work as follows: in order to check if a compound system P ||Q satisfies
a formula f (where f says, e.g., that the system is correct), it is enough to check whether both P and Q
separately satisfy f . (Notation || represents the parallel composition of processes, see also the appendix.)
The existence of such a principle would be particularly appealing for the target of our analysis. Indeed, the
state-space of the system P ||Q is usually considerably bigger than those of P and Q, separately. Above all,
it would help in analyzing systems with a possibly unbounded number of components. Indeed, consider the
parallel composition of n instances of process P :
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
P || . . . ||P
To prove that the overall system enjoys f (for whatever n) it is sufficient to prove that P enjoys f .
Compositional principles will be used to verify i) an integrity property, i.e., a sort of robustness against
packet modification, and ii) a secrecy property requiring, informally, that the contents of the stream remains
unknown to everybody but the sender and the intended receivers.
Some of these principles were first introduced in [GM04] for the Generalized Non Deducibility on Com-
positions scheme of properties, (GNDC for short), defined in [FGM00a, FM99, FGM04]. In turn, the scheme
(reminded in Appendix B) is based on the seminal notion of non-interference ( [GM82]). We use these princi-
ples to verify an instance of a stream signature protocol dealing with packet loss, see [PCTS00] and section 2.2
of this paper. Also, Subsection 3.4 shows an application of compositionality to analyze confidentiality in a
multicast protocol that use group encryption techniques [WHA99].
A variant of this principle was introduced in [GMPV03b, GM04] within a formal framework aimed at
verifying timed security properties, i.e., security properties whose fulfilment is based on timed conditions.
In turn, the timed formal framework, namely the timed-Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions
(tGNDC for short) has been introduced in [GM04]. Part of Appendix B is devoted to recall the tGNDC
schema. The principle is applied in Subsection 3.3 to verify a protocol for broadcast authentication of data
in wireless sensor networks [PST+02].
Case studies. The case studies considered throughout the paper are: 1) the Gennaro-Rohatgi proto-
col [GR01], a pioneering protocol introduced in 1997 to sign digital streams; 2) the Efficient Multi-chained
Stream Signature protocol (EMSS) proposed in [PCTS00]. This stream signature protocol implements a sig-
nificant improvement over the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol, since EMSS guarantees some robustness against
packet loss; 3) the µTESLA (“micro” Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication, [PST+02]), a
protocol to provide authenticated broadcast in wireless sensor networks environments; 4) finally, a protocol
to distribute a secret key to a multicast group, [WHA99].
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the following.
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i) We formally model and analyze some relevant proposals for authenticating data streams and for giving
them data confidentiality. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to prove some of the security
properties of those protocols (by means of compositional rules).
ii) Starting from modeling the basic scheme of Gennaro and Rohatgi, passing through protocols dealing
with packet loss, concluding with a time-dependent security wireless protocol and with a secure distribution
of a key, the proposed analysis aims at allowing the modeling and formal validation of a spectrum of secure
multicast and wireless protocols.
iii) Contrary to previous work in the area, e.g., [Arc02, BL02], the proposed analysis is able to check a
specification with an unbounded number of components.
Summary. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the informal description and the formal
model of the case studies. Section 3 is dedicated to the analysis of some security properties of the presented
protocols. Finally, some conclusions are given.
Even though our effort was to write down a self contained paper, the appendixes report more information
regarding the theory behind the application. In particular, they report the syntax of the formal languages
used in the paper, they recall the GNDC and tGNDC schemata and they present some proofs.
2. Modeling multicast communication
In this section, we present and formally model some security protocols aiming at ensuring integrity and
authenticity of the so called digital streams, while section 3.4 proposes a formal model for distributing a
secret key to a multicast group, [WHA99].
Typically, communication involves one sender and an arbitrary number of receivers. We start to de-
scribe the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol (in its off-line version), [GR01], in order to introduce the reader to the
architecture of a simple scheme for signing streams, and to give basic concepts of our modeling.
2.1. The Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol
In [GR01], Gennaro and Rohatgi developed a mechanism to sign digital streams. They aim at assuring a
receiver that the information he received is exactly what the sender has intended.
Applications that deal with streams are typically digitized audio and video, data feeds, applets. This kind
of applications requires the user to consume the data it receives at almost the input rate, without excessive
delay. For this reason, signing digital streams represents a different problem compared with the signature of
finite messages. Traditional digital signature schemes do not fit properly because they require the receiver
to process the entire message in order to verify the signature.
The Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol should be considered paradigmatic, being essentially, in its 1997 version,
one of the first proposals to efficiently solve the problem to sign digital streams. Efficient cryptographic
solutions (i.e., fast to be computed and verified, with respect to the time in which these authors made the
proposal) have been adopted in the protocol to allow the entities at stake to minimize their communication
and computation overhead.
The authors present two solutions to the problem, distinguishing two cases: i) the off-line case: a finite
stream which is entirely known to the sender (e.g., a movie); ii) the on-line case: a potentially infinite stream
not known in advance to the sender (e.g., a live broadcast for news feed).
We model the off-line scheme below. For details about the on-line scheme, the reader is referred to [GR01,
GMPV03a].
The off-line scheme relies on the basic idea to divide the stream into blocks and to add cryptographic
information in each block such that receivers use information retrieved in earlier blocks to legitimate later
blocks.
We first use an intuitive notation usually reported in literature. We consider a set of agents able to send
and receive messages. With the following notation,
cj A→ B : msg
we represent the transmission of message msg from a sender A to a receiver B. cj is the j-th communi-
cation channel.
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x y
Pair(x, y)
(pair)
Pair(x, y)
x (fst)
Pair(x, y)
y (snd)
x sk(y)
{x}sk(y)
(sign)
{x}sk(y) pk(y)
x (ver)
x
h(x)
(hash)
Fig. 1. Inference system for the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol.
Thus, let {bi} ∈ Msgs be the set of meaningful payloads, i = 1 . . . l. It is assumed that the sender’s
private key sk(S) does not occur in the set {bi}. h(m) is the digest of m after applying the hash function;
{m}sk(S) is message m digitally signed by the sender’s private key sk(S). len is the number of blocks in
which the stream is divided. Then, the protocol for the off-line case is:
c0 S → R : b
′
0
ci S → R : b
′
i i = 1..l − 1
cl S → R : bl
where
b
′
0 = {len, h(b
′
1)}sk(S)
b
′
i = bi, h(b
′
i+1) i = 1..l − 1
b
′
l = bl
It exploits the technique of embedding the hash of the following block in the current block. Bootstrapping
integrity of the digital stream is obtained by applying a single traditional signature in combination with hash
chaining.
The sender S first divides the stream into l blocks. Then, S generates block b
′
0, i.e., the digital signature
of the encoding of the length of the stream len, plus the hash of the subsequent block b
′
1. After verification
of the signature the receiver knows how many blocks are expected to be received and what the hash of the
first block should be and then it starts receiving the full stream (blocks b
′
i). When the receiver receives the
first block b
′
1, it computes its hash and checks the hash against what the signature was verified upon. The
other blocks consist of an authentication chain, in which each block contains the hash of the subsequent
block. Note that embedding the hash of the subsequent block implies that the sender knows the stream in
advance, hence the non feasibility of this construction for applications like live broadcasts.
It is worth noticing that in the original paper [GR01], the first block contains an encoding of the length
of the stream. The structure of the first block is here simplified (without however affecting the results of the
analysis that will follow). Furthermore, we assume the receiver knows in advance the number of blocks in
which the stream is divided.
2.1.1. Crypto-CCS specification of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol
To formally specify the protocol, the sender and the receiver are modelled as Crypto-CCS processes, see App. A.
The modelling of possible operations on messages is given by an inference system, consisting of a set of rules
r, e.g., . r = m1 . . . mnm0 where {m1, . . . ,mn} is a set of messages (called premises, possibly empty) and
m0 is the conclusion.
In the following, the application of rule r to messages m0, . . . ,mn and a consequent behaviour of the
process is denoted as [m0, . . . ,mn ⊢r xm]A1;A2, where A1 and A2 are Crypto-CCS processes too, and it
represents the inference construct. Each conclusion xm of an inference construct is a message variable and it
means “variable x should contain message m”. If, by applying rule r to premises m0, . . . ,mn a message m
can be inferred, then the process behaves as A1, otherwise the process behaves as A2. When A2 is missing,
if no message m can be inferred, the process aborts. Notation c!m is message m sent on channel c; notation
c?x is some message variable x received on channel c. Finally, 0 is the process that does nothing.
It is worth noticing that the syntax and semantics of Crypto-CCS are parametric with respect to a
given inference system. Indeed, one of the strengths of the language adopted for modeling is its flexibility in
specifying operations on messages. In the following, we will show how it is possible to manipulate exchanged
messages, by appositely defining opportune inference systems according to the protocols to be modelled.
As the first example, a suitable inference system that is used to model the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol
is shown in Fig. 1. Rule (pair) builds the pair of two messages x and y; rules (fst) and (snd) return the
components of a pair; rule (sign) allows message x to be digitally signed by applying the secret key sk(y) of
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agent y; rule (ver) allows a digital signature {x}sk(y) to be verified by applying the public key of signer y,
pk(y); rule (hash) allows an agent to apply a one-way hash function to message x and obtain digest h(x).
Example 1. A typical use of the Crypto-CCS inference construct may be as follows, where a process receives
a signed message x over channel c and tries to verify the signature. If it succeeds, then the value is sent over
channel out, otherwise the process outputs an error message err.
c?x. receive x on channel c
[x pk ⊢ver y] verify signature
out!y.0; in the positive case. output y and stop
out!err.0 otherwise, output an error message and stop
The specification of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol follows.
The sender process builds the initialization block b
′
0 (more precisely, he builds a variable containing
b
′
0) to bootstrap the chain: by means of rule sign in Fig. 1 the sender computes block b
′
0, sends it on
communication channel c0 and travels to the next state Sender1. The generic Senderi, 1 ≤ i < l now sends
payloads bi together with hashed blocks h(b
′
i+1) until the last state l is reached.
Sender0
.
=
[len h(b
′
1) ⊢pair xpair] Pair lenght and hash of next block
[xpair sk(S) ⊢sign xb′
0
] Sign pair
c0!xb′
0
.Sender1 Output b
′
0 and go to next state
Senderi
.
= 1 ≤ i < l
[bi h(b
′
i+1) ⊢pair xb′
i
] Pair payload and hash of next block
ci!xb′
i
.Senderi+1 Output b
′
i and go to next state
Senderl
.
=
cl!bl.0 Output last block and stop
The receiver process is parameterized by the hashed blocks he receives from the sender and by the number
of the expected blocks (more precisely, by variables that should contain these values).
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Receiver0(null, null)
.
=
c0?xb′
0
. Receive initial block
[xb′
0
pk(S) ⊢ver xpair] V erify signature
[xpair ⊢fst xlen] Extract lenght
[xpair ⊢snd xh(b′
1
)] Extract hash next block
Receiver1(xh(b′
1
), xlen) Go to next state
Receiveri(xh(b′
i
), xlen)
.
= 1 ≤ i < l
ci?xb′
i
. Receive i− th block
[xb′
i
⊢hash xh(b′
MY i
)] Compute my hash h(b
′
MY i)
[xh(b′
i
) = xh(b′
MY i
)] Compare hash
[xb′
i
⊢fst xbi ] Extract payload
couti !xbi . Send payload to application level
[xb′
i
⊢snd xh(b′
i+1
)] Extract hash of next block and
Receiveri+1(xh(b′
i+1
)) Go to next state
Receiverl(xh(b′
l
), xlen)
.
=
cl?xb′
l
. Receive last block
[xb′
l
⊢hash xh(b′
MY l
)] Compute my hash h(b
′
MY l)
[xh(b′
l
) = xh(b′
MY l
)] Compare hash
coutl !xb′
l
.0 Send block to application level and stop
In the initial state the receiver aims at verifying the digital signature (we assume he has previously retrieved
the public key pk(S) corresponding to the private key of the supposed sender). Then, it travels to the next
state Receiveri(xh(b′
1
), xlen), by maintaining history of the (supposed) next hashed block h(b
′
1) and of the
(supposed) total number of blocks. Acceptance of the subsequent blocks is conditioned to the successful
outcome of the equality tests between the hash it maintains as a parameter and the hash it computes from
what it has presently received, respectively xh(b′
i
) and xh(b′
MY i
). If the hashes coincide, the receiver sends the
meaningful payload contained in xbi to the application level to consume it. This sending operation is over
channel couti . The receiver then extracts the supposed hash of the block to be received immediately later.
This mechanism is repeated until the reception of the l-th block. Whether the verification of the signature
in the initial state or the equality tests in subsequent states do not succeed the receiver should abort.
2.1.2. Extending the model to multiple receivers
Extending the model to the treatment of multicast and broadcast communication (i.e., by allowing a po-
tentially unbounded number of receivers) is as follows: a new process MB is added, that is responsible for
potentially sending each block an unbounded number of times in order to simulate a one-to-many (one-to-all)
sending typical of a multicast (broadcast) communication. The new process is parameterized by the block
the sender is to multicast (or broadcast).
MBi(xb′
i
)
.
= ci!xb′
i
.MBi(xb′
i
)
Thus, in the light of this new process, the specification for the sender process can be re-written as follows.
P1||P2 denotes a parallel execution of two processes (details in App. A).
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Sender0
.
=
[len h(b
′
1) ⊢pair xpair]
[xpair sk(S) ⊢sign xb′
0
]
(Sender1||MB0(xb′
0
)) Output b
′
0 and go to next state
Senderi
.
= 1 ≤ i < l
[bi h(b
′
i+1) ⊢pair xb′
i
]
(Senderi+1||MBi(xb′
i
)) Output b
′
i and go to next state
Senderl
.
= MBl(bl) Output bl and go to next state
2.2. The EMSS protocol
Digital streams are usually sent over UDP, the User Datagram Protocol, [Pos80]. UDP is considered to be an
unreliable transport protocol, i.e., when UDP sends packets over a network, it just sends them and forgets
about them. This does not mean that UDP is ineffective, only that it does not handle reliability of the
communication. If a stream is received incomplete, we would still like to be able to prove the integrity of all
the packets that were not lost.
Along with the pioneering protocol modelled in the previous section, protocols dealing with the problem of
securing streamed data over channels with packet loss have been recently proposed, [PCTS00, PCS02, GM01].
They all can be basically considered as valuable extensions of the Gennaro-Rohatgi constructions.
In particular, in [PCTS00], Perrig et al. presented the Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS)
protocol to sign digital streams. EMSS exploits a combination of hash functions and digital signatures and–
contrary to previous proposals [GR01]–achieves (some) robustness against packet loss.
The basic idea of EMSS is the following: a hash of packet Pi−1 is appended to packet Pi, whose hash is
in turn appended to packet Pi+1 and so on. A signature packet, containing the hash of the final data packet
along with a signature, is sent at the end of the stream. To achieve robustness against packet loss (the event
of one or more packets loss would break the chain) each packet contains multiple hashes of previous packets
and the signature packet signs hashes of multiple packets. [PCTS00] uses both deterministic and random
distribution of hashes per packet.
Here we focus on a specific instance of the EMSS, the deterministic (1,2) schema, where packet Pi contains
hashes of packets i− 1, i− 2 and whose hash is contained in packets i+ 1, i+ 2. After an initial phase, each
packet Pi contains a meaningful payload mi
1 together with the hashes h(Pi−1) and h(Pi−2) of the previous
two packets sent. Packets are sent over channels ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ last from a sender S to a set of receivers
{Rn | n ≥ 1}. The end of a stream is indicated by a signature packet Psign over channel csign, containing
the hashes of the final two packets, along with a digital signature. The protocol can informally be described
as follows.
c0 S → {Rn} : P0
c1 S → {Rn} : P1
ci S → {Rn} : Pi 2 ≤ i ≤ last
where
P0 = m0
P1 = m1, h(P0)
Pi = mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2) 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Let Plast be the last packet of the stream. Upon sending Plast a signature packet Psign is sent:
csign S → {Rn} : Psign = {h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(S)
A packet Pi is said to be verifiable if there exists a path (in terms of hashes contained in a chain of
packets) from Pi to the signature packet. Note that verifiability depends on a bound of the number of lost
packets, and on the reception of the signature packet.
Given a set of verifiable packets, we intend to prove the correctness of the construction in terms of packet
1 We assume the sender’s private key sk(S) cannot be deduced from the set of messages {mi}.
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x y z
(x, y, z)
(triple)
(x, y, z)
x (1-st)
(x, y, z)
y (2-nd)
(x, y, z)
z (3-rd)
x sk(y)
{x}sk(y)
(sign)
{x}sk(y) pk(y)
x (ver)
x
h(x)
(hash)
Fig. 2. Inference system for EMSS.
integrity, i.e., to assure a receiver that the information it received is exactly what the sender has originally
intended. For the analysis, see Section 3.1.
2.2.1. Crypto-CCS specifications of the (1,2) EMSS.
We present the Crypto-CCS specifications of the (1,2) scheme of the EMSS protocol.
We remind that the whole formalization, in particular the way a receiver process acts, is based on imple-
mentative choices of the authors since some details are not explicitly given in [PCTS00].
A suitable inference system that is used to model EMSS is shown in Fig. 2. Rule (triple) builds the
triple of three messages x, y and z; rules (1-st), (2-nd) and (3-rd) return, respectively, the first, second and
third component of a triple; rules (sign), (ver) and (hash) are the same as in the inference system for the
Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol.
The sender process is parameterized by variables containing the hashes it should insert in the following
packet. As in the formalization of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol, with notation xm we mean “variable x
should contain message m”. Hereafter, state last+ 1 coincides with state sign.
S0(null, null)
.
=
[m0 ⊢triple xP0 ] Create triple P0 : (m0, null, null)
[xP0 ⊢hash xh(P0)] Compute hash of P0
(S1(xh(P0), null)||MB0(xP0)) Output P0 and go to next state
S1(xh(P0), null)
.
=
[m1 xh(P0) ⊢triple xP1 ] Create triple P1 : (m1, xh(P0), null)
[xP1 ⊢hash xh(P1)] Compute hash of P1
(S2(xh(P1), xh(P0))||MB1(xP1)) Output P1 and go to next state
Si(xh(Pi−1), xh(Pi−2))
.
= 2 ≤ i ≤ last
[mi xh(Pi−1) xh(Pi−2) ⊢triple xPi ] Create triple Pi
[xPi ⊢hash xh(Pi)] Compute hash of current packet
(Si+1(xh(Pi), xh(Pi−1))||MBi(xPi)) Output Pi and go to next state
Ssign(xh(Plast), xh(Plast−1))
.
=
[xh(Plast) xh(Plast−1) ⊢triple xt] Create triple of final hashes
[xt sk(S) ⊢sign xPsign ] Sign the triple
MBsign(xPsign) Output the signature packet
Again, the special process MB is responsible for potentially sending each packet an unbounded number
of times, in order to simulate a one-to-many (one-to-all) sending. The process is parameterized by the packet
the sender is to multicast (or broadcast).
MBi(xPi)
.
= ci!xPi .MBi(xPi) 0 ≤ i ≤ last
MBsign(xPsign)
.
= csign!xPsign .MBsign(xPi)
Among the set of receivers, each process behaves in the same way. The generic receiver process at step i
is parameterized by:
• the two last packets it has received at steps i-1, i-2. Let them be Pi−1, Pi−2 - over the real channel, with
packet loss, we could have that one of them, or even both, are empty fields. Empty fields are indicated
with the term null.
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• a tuple tupi−1{mj}. tup{mj} consists of the ordered sequence of payloads among {mj}j=0,1,...last whose corre-
sponding packets’ hashes h(Pj) the receiver was able to check. tup
i−1
{mj}
is the tuple updated at step i, by
inserting either xmi−2 or xmi−3 . The updated tuple could be either (xmi−2 , tup
i−2
{mj}
) or (xmi−3 , tup
i−2
{mj}
).
Also, it may remain unchanged, when both mi−2 and mi−3 are lost. Similarly, tup
last
{mj}
may either be
(xmlast , tup
last−1
{mj}
) or (xmlast−1 , tup
last−1
{mj}
) or, unchanged, tuplast{mj}.
The unreliability of the transmission over UDP is modeled by considering that process Rec non deter-
ministically chooses whether to receive a packet or not. Finally, we assume that the signature packet Psign
is always received (this is likely since in the original protocol multiple copies of the signature packets are
sent). In the specification, 0 ≤ i ≤ last and last+ 1 ≡ sign. P−1, P−2 are necessarily empty fields.
Reci(xPi−1 , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)
.
=
Reci+1(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
) + Packet loss : go to next state, otherwise
(ci?xPi . Receive packet Pi
([xPi−1 = null] Was Pi−1 received? No, then
([xPi−2 = null] Was Pi−2 received? No, then
Reci+1(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
); Go to next state
(Pi−1 and Pi−2 were not received), otherwise
Rec′′i (xPi , xPi−1 , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
) Go to state Rec′′i (Pi−2 was received), otherwise
);
Rec′i(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
Go to Rec′i (Pi−1 was received)
)
)
Rec′i(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)
.
=
[xPi ⊢2−nd xh(Pi−1)] Extract h(Pi−1) from Pi
[xPi−1 ⊢hash xhMY (Pi−1)] Compute my hash hMY (Pi−1)
[xhMY (Pi−1) = xh(Pi−1)] Compare the hashes
([xPi−1 ⊢1−st xmi−1 ] IF equal : extract mi−1 from Pi−1
Reci+1(xPi , xPi−1 , (xmi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)) Update parameters and go to next state
);0 ELSE : abort
Rec′′i (xPi , , xPi−1 , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)
.
=
[xPi ⊢3−rd xh(Pi−2)] Extract h(Pi−2) from Pi
[xPi−2 ⊢hash xhMY (Pi−2)] Compute my hash hMY (Pi−2)
[xhMY (Pi−2) = xh(Pi−2)] Compare the hashes
([xPi−2 ⊢1−st xmi−2 ] IF equal : extract mi−2 from Pi−2
Reci+1(xPi , xPi−1 , (xmi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)) Update parameters and go to next state
);0 ELSE : abort
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Recsign(xPlast , xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)
.
=
csign?xPsign . Receive signature packet
Rec∗sign(xPsign , xPlast , xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
) Go to intermediate state Rec∗sign
Rec∗sign(xPsign , xPlast , xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)
.
=
[xPsign pk(S) ⊢ver xver] V erify the signature
[xPlast = null] Was Plast received? No, then
([xP
last−1
= null] Was Plast−1 received? No, then
capp!tup
last
{mj}
.0; Plast and Plast−1 were not received : send the stream
of verifiable payloads to the application level and stop;
Rec′′sign(xver, xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
) otherwise, if Plast−1 received, go to Rec
′′
sign;
);
Rec′sign(xver, xPlast , tup
last
{mj}
); otherwise, if Plast received, go to Rec
′
sign
Rec′′sign(xver, xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)
.
=
[xver ⊢2−nd xh(Plast−1)] Extract h(Plast−1) from Psign
[xPlast−1 ⊢hash xhMY (Plast−1)] Compute my hash hMY (Plast−1)
[xhMY (Plast−1) = xh(Plast−1)] Compare the hashes
[xPlast−1 ⊢1−st xmlast−1 ] IF equal : extract mlast−1 from Plast−1
capp!(xmlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
).0; Send the stream of verifiable payloads
0 to the application level and stop; ELSE abort
Rec′sign(xver, xPlast , tup
last
{mj}
)
.
=
[xver ⊢1−st xh(Plast)] Extract h(Plast) from Psign
[xPlast ⊢hash xhMY (Plast)] Compute my hash hMY (Plast)
[xhMY (Plast) = xh(Plast)] Compare the hashes
[xPlast ⊢1−st xmlast ] IF equal : extract mlast from Plast
capp!(xmlast , tup
last
{mj}
).0; Send the stream of verifiable payloads
0 to the application level and stop;ELSE abort
In the final state Recsign (along with intermediate states Rec
∗
sign, Rec
′
sign, Rec
′′
sign) the receiver aims at
verifying the digital signature (we assume it has previously retrieved the public key pk(S) corresponding to
the private key of the supposed sender). The correct verification of the signature implies the receiver to have
guarantees on the integrity of the verifiable payloads. It can now send the stream to the application level
to consume it. In our formalization, this is modeled by a scenario where the receiver sends the content of
its parameter tuple (the accepted stream) over channel capp. If the verification of the signature in the final
state or the equality tests in the previous states do not succeed the receiver should abort.
2.3. The µTESLA protocol
In [PST+02], Perrig et al. presented µTESLA (“micro” Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentica-
tion), a protocol to provide authenticated broadcast in wireless sensor networks environments. [PST+02]
considers a scenario where sensors communicate with a base-station connected to the external world. The
base station may broadcast to all nodes messages for routing updates, reprogramming, reset requests. The
protocol is an extension of the TESLA stream authentication protocol developed in [PCST01] and it was
intentionally developed for providing authenticated broadcast for the limited computing environments that
are encountered in sensor networks.
In the original TESLA schema, a single sender broadcasts a continuous stream of packets. Receivers may
use information in later packets to authenticate earlier packets. Each packet contains a message authentica-
tion code (MAC), i.e., a value computed by applying a public algorithm and a secret encryption key to the
packet itself. Given a message m and an encryption key k, we call mac(m, k) the message authentication
12 R.Gorrieri and F.Martinelli and M.Petrocchi
-
Time
6 6
Pi−1
mi−1
mac(mi−1,
Ki−1)
Key Packet
Ki−2
Pi
mi
mac(mi,
Ki)
Key Packet
Ki−1
Pi+1
mi+1
mac(mi+1,
Ki+1)
Key Packet
Ki
F (Ki−2) = Ki−3 F (Ki−1) = Ki−2 F (Ki) = Ki−1
Fig. 3. A µTESLA instantiation.
code of m. The algorithm is known by all the receivers, while the encryption keys are disclosed by the sender
after a certain amount of time. When a receiver receives a key Ki it can use it to compute the MAC from the
related packet Pi and compare the computed MAC with that previously received. If the two MACs match,
the receiver can consider the packet Pi authentic. To avoid the event that an intruder could use a disclosed
key Ki to fake the packet Pi a time synchronization protocol between the sender and the receivers is needed.
Then, each receiver will not accept the packet Pi if the sender might have already disclosed the key Ki.
Bootstrapping authentication of the whole scheme is achieved in TESLA by signing the first packet with
a regular digital signature scheme. Nevertheless, computation, communication and storage overhead make
the use of asymmetric cryptography unfeasible for the net of sensors under investigation. Thus, µTESLA has
been proposed as an optimized extension for sensor networks. It just makes use of MACs. The base-station
randomly generates the last MAC key to be used, Klast, and derives a key chain by repeatedly applying
a publicly known one-way function F to that key, such that Ki = F (Ki+1). Given the non-reversibility
property (at least with high probability) of function F, the disclosure of key Ki should not lead to any
knowledge of Ki+1 and subsequent keys.
Receivers’ requirements for correctly joining and executing the protocol are: i) they are time synchronized
with the base station; ii) they know the disclosure schedule of the MAC keys; iii) they know at least one
authenticated key of the key chain, serving as a commitment to the entire chain. A protocol providing time
synchronization and one authenticated key has been proposed in [PST+02]. Basically, the base-station shares
with each sensor a symmetric secret key KSM and establishes a secure channel over which the exchange of
a commitment to the key chain, K0, and a set of temporal parameters, sett, takes place. There are as many
symmetric keys as the number of sensors and this initial communication is a point to point communication.
This inizialitazion phase can be informally described as follows:
cm S → Rm : P0 = K0, sett,mac(K0, sett,K
m
SM ) m ∈ N
where S is the identifier of the sender (i.e., the base station) and Rm, with m ∈ N, is the m-th receiver (i.e.,
the sensor).
µTESLA is parameterized by the schedule time at which MAC keys are disclosed. For the description
of further steps in the protocol we consider a basic formalization, Fig. 3, where we suppose that the sender
discloses a MAC key with a delay δ = 1, assumed to fall in the interval after that key has been used to
compute the MAC. Further, we suppose the sender sends one packet per time interval. Basically, in each
time slot a packet and a key packet will be sent, see Fig. 3. First of all, each receiver should check the
integrity of the received key, say Ki, by verifying it w.r.t. an authenticated commitment (e.g., by checking
K0 = F
i(Ki)), then the verified key will be used to verify the integrity of the packet received in the previous
time slot.
ci S → {Rm} : Pi = mi,mac(mi,Ki) i ≥ 1
Packet Pi consists of a meaningful payload mi plus the message authentication code computed on mi
with key Ki. We assume that each shared key K
m
SM cannot be deduced from the sets {mi}, {Ki}. This is a
multicast communication between the base station S and each sensor in the set of receivers {Rm}.
Upon receiving the packet, the sensors store the packet until its MAC can be verified, i.e., until the
sender broadcasts packet disclosing Ki:
ci+1 S → {Rm} : Ki (Key Packet)
The integrity of key Ki can be checked by verifying K0 = F
i(Ki) (or, equivalently, Ki−1 = F (Ki)). Packets
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Fig. 4. Inference system for µTESLA.
may be lost in transit from the base station to the sensors. In particular µTESLA is tolerant to packet
loss in the sense that receivers may still be able to authenticate all the received packets Pi even when the
corresponding keys’ disclosure packets are lost. Suppose Kj is lost, then a receiver is not able to verify
MAC packet Pj . The following key the receiver recovers, let it be Kj+1, can be verified w.r.t. a previous
authenticated key (e.g., K0 = F
j+1(Kj+1)) and is used to derive Kj , i.e. Kj = F (Kj+1).
2.3.1. The tCryptoSPA specifications of the µTESLA protocol
Part of the complexity in the construction of protocols like µTESLA consists of the temporal constraints
that are present, since, e.g., a time synchronization is needed among the actors in the protocol.
Within a formal framework aimed at modeling timed constraints in protocols and at verifying security
properties whose fulfilment is based on timed conditions, we give here the tCryptoSPA specification of the
basic µTESLA presented in Fig. 3.
Indeed, the fundamental requirement of a time synchronization between the base station and each sensor
in µTESLA is naturally captured in tCryptoSPA (Appendix A.2) by its time modeling action tick, upon
which sender and receivers’ processes may synchronize.
A suitable inference system that is used to model µTESLA is shown in Fig. 4. Rule (one-way) allows to
apply a one-way hash function F to message m and obtain digest F (m); rule mac computes the message
authentication code (MAC) of a message with a key; rules (pair), (fst) and (snd) are the same as in the
inference system for the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol.
We consider a sender machine with ample resources. It can be parallelized or split into n senders, each
of them possibly sending different streams, {mji}i≥1,1≤j≤n. We first present the generic sender process S
j .
We assume the keys belonging to the key chain and the streams of packets to be different for each process
Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n2.
Sj1
.
=
[mj1 K
j
1 ⊢mac x] Compute MAC
[mj1 x ⊢pair P1] Create packet P1
Bj1(P1) Start to broadcast P1
Sji
.
=
[mji K
j
i ⊢mac x] Compute MAC
[mji x ⊢pair Pi] Create packet Pi
Bji (Pi) Start to broadcast Pi and disclose key Ki−1
Bji (Pi)
.
= ciPi.B
j
i (Pi) + tick.S
j
i+1 i = 1
Bji (Pi)
.
= ciPi.ciK
j
i−1.B
j
i (Pi) + tick.S
j
i+1 i ≥ 2
Construct Bji (. . .) is responsible for potentially sending packets (and keys) an unbounded number of times, in
order to simulate multicast sessions. Sender Sj remains in the same state repeatedly sending messages unless
the non-deterministic choice is resolved by choosing the derivative of the second summand in Bji ; this causes
a time unit to pass (a tick action is performed). The construction models the behaviour of a wireless antenna
2 We remind the reader that the whole formalization we are going to give is based on personal choices since some details are
not explicitly given in [PST+02]. In particular, the mechanism through which a receiver possibly identifies each sender process
(and consequently each stream) is not defined in [PST+02], since the original construction is described with a single sender.
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making signals available only in a particular time interval. The presence of a non-deterministic choice in the
construct makes it possible the passage to the following time interval without performing any number of,
possibly zero, communication. This may implicitly model the unreliability of the wireless transmission and
the occurrence of packet loss.
Among the receivers’ set, each process behaves in the same way. The generic receiver process at step i
is parameterized by the packets it should still authenticate (fields for parameters are left empty when no
packet must be verified).
We assume the receiver’s set is divided into subgroups. Receivers belonging to subgroup number j,
governed by Sender Sj , are devoted to a particular service. As an example, let us consider pay per view-
based applications. Among the receivers’ set, the subgroup number j may consist of all the paying spectators
for movie number j. For environments closer to those depicted for µTESLA, let us consider a scenario in
which sensors are used to periodically transmit readings regarding heating and air conditioning control in a
building (and consequently receive broadcasted messages for routing updates or reprogramming): sensors in
subgroup j may be all the sensors devoted to carry out the service for room number j, Sj being the base
station responsible for room number j.
Below, we refer to Rj,qi to indicate the q-th receiver process belonging to subgroup j and acting at step i.
Rj,q1 ()
.
=
(c1(yP1). Receive packet and
tick.Rj,q2 (yP1) Allow a time unit to pass and go to next state
) + tick.Rj,q2 () Or : go to next state after a time unit
Rj,q1 is willing to accept any arbitrary packet, because it cannot perform any verification yet. If nothing
is received before the end of a time unit, a transition takes place to next state Rj,q2 . Below, we model the
generic Ri, i ≥ 2.
Rj,qi (yPi−1)
.
=
ci(yPi).R
′j,q
i (yPi , yPi−1) Receive i-th packet ; go to intermediate state R
′j ,q
i
+tick.Rj,qi+1() Or : go to next state after a time unit
Rj,qi is willing to accept packet Pi and travels to an intermediate state R
′j,q
i . If nothing is received before
the end of a time unit, a transition takes place to the next state.
R′j,qi (yPi , yPi−1)
.
=
ci(xKi−1). Receive key packet
[Kj0 = F
i−1(xKi−1)] Verify the key w .r .t . the commitment K0
[yPi−1 ⊢fst ypay] Extract payload
([ypay xKi−1 ⊢mac z] If xKi−1 = K
j
i−1 then : Compute MAC
[yPi−1 ⊢snd ymac] Extract MAC
[z = ymac] Verify MAC
appypay. Send m
j
i−1 to application level
tick.Rj,qi+1(yPi) Allow a time unit to pass and go to next state;
);R′j,qi (yPi , yPi−1) Otherwise, wait for the correct key
In intermediate state R′j,qi receives a key packet and verifies the correctness of the key w.r.t. the authenticated
commitment Kj0 (here modeled as a constant the process has in its initial knowledge, thanks to an opportune
bootstrapping phase). Given the collision-free property of one-way functions, if the verification does not
succeed it means xKi−1 6= K
j
i−1 and R
′j,q
i simply stays in the same state waiting for the right subgroup
key. If the verification succeeds, the correctness of Pi−1 is verified by checking that the enclosed MAC is
authentic. The successful outcome is here modeled by a scenario where the receiver sends the payload of the
accepted packet over channel app3.
3 We omitted to insert an idling behavior when a deduction construct fails to be executed and in our formalization the system
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Suppose packet Pi−1 was correctly received, suppose also packet disclosing K
j
i−1 is lost. At step i the
receiver still cannot authenticate packet Pi−1. The key chain mechanism of the original protocol takes
into account such a possibility: in interval i + 1 the base station broadcasts key Kji , which the receiver
authenticates by verifying Kj0 = F
i(Kji ). The receiver can authenticate Pi and derives K
j
i−1 = F (K
j
i ), so
it can also authenticate Pi−1. Actually, our formalization does not take into account recovering lost keys.
For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to suppose that the key packet related to subgroup j is received (state
R′j,qi ).
We report below the formalization at step i, with i ≥ 2, when a packet was not received at step i− 1.
Rj,qi ()
.
=
ci(pi).tick.R
j,q
i+1(yPi) Receive i-th packet ; go to next state
+tick.Rj,qi+1() Or : go to next state after a time unit
2.4. The N Root/Leaf pairwise keys protocol
Secrecy in multicast groups means that only the group members (and all of them) should be able to decipher
transmitted data ([CGI+99]).
To achieve secrecy, the approach presented in [WHA99] is a “brute force method to provide a common
multicast group key to the group participants”.
The N Root/Leaf pairwise keys protocol assumes the existence of a multicast session with an initiator
that controls the multicast group. Each of the N members of the multicast group is called a leaf. The initiator
is the root of the group. In a preliminary phase, the initiator generates a pairwise key with each of the leaves
in the multicast group (e.g., using some standard public key exchange technique).
Then, it generates the group key K and, in order to distribute it to the leaves, the initiator encrypts K
with the pairwise keys shared with them. This distribution can happen through a transmission to the whole
group via multicast (the transmission on channel c1). On receiving that message, each leaf can retrieve K
from the appropriate segment of the message using its own secret pairwise key. Once the group key has been
distributed, it can be used to multicast to the group some ciphered message m.
c1 I → {Ln} : {K}KIL1 |{K}KIL2 | . . . |{K}KILN
c2 I → {Ln} : {m}K
In the above notation, I is the initiator of the multicast group. {Ln} is the set of the N leaves. | stands
for concatenation. KILi is the pairwise key shared between the initiator and the i-th leaf. K is the group
key.
The Crypto-CCS specification of the protocol is the following.
I1
.
=
[k kIL1 ⊢enc x{k}kIL1
] Encrypt group key
. . . Repeat encryption N times
[x{k}kIL1
. . . x{k}kILN
⊢tuple xP1 ] Create tuple
I2||MB1(xP1) Output P1 and go to next state
I2
.
=
[m k ⊢enc xmk ] Encrypt message
MB2(xmk) Output xmk
Process MB simulates a one-to-many sending and it is specified as follows.
MBi(x)
.
= ci!x.MBi(x) i = 1, 2
The specification of the n-th receiver process is as follows:
simply stops without letting time pass. This is not realistic, but it has no consequences since we use trace semantics for the
analysis and makes it simpler.
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Ln1
.
= 1 ≤ n ≤ N
c1?x. Receive concatenation
[x ⊢nth z] Retrieve encryption
[z KILn ⊢dec xK ]L
n
2 (xK) Decrypt and go to next state
Ln2 (xK)
.
=
c2?x. Receive encrypted message
[x xK ⊢dec xm].0 Retrieve m
3. Analysis
In this section, we perform a security analysis of the protocols presented in the previous sections. In particular,
we consider two integrity properties, one in an untimed version and one in a timed version, for what concerns,
respectively, the EMSS protocol and the µTESLA protocol, while a secrecy property will be taken into
account for a study on the N Root/Leaf pairwise protocol. As far as the analysis of an integrity property
of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol is concerned, here we will limit ourselves to recalling the guidelines of the
procedure, since it is very similar to what has be done for EMSS.
For details about the analysis methodology, the reader is referred to the appendixes, as well as to several
references cited throughout the paper. However, aiming at producing, as much as possible, a self contained
paper, we recall here the general flavor of the methodology (in the untimed version only).
The foundation of the analysis is the seminal idea of non interference, [GM82] for investigating the
unauthorized information flow in multilevel systems, e.g., from a high level to a lower one. By starting
from there, a general schema for the definition of security properties has been formulated, [FGM00a, FM99,
FGM04], in order to encompass in a uniform way a variety of properties. The schema, namely Generalized
Non Deducibility on Compositions, GNDC for short, basically compares what it is expected to be the correct
behaviour of a system with a modified behaviour due to the fact that the system is not running in isolation,
but it is running together with a malicious process, the so called intruder, trying to interfere with the normal
execution of the system. If the two behaviors appear to be the same, then it means that the intruder has
not sufficient means to significantly interfere with the honest system and that the investigated property is
guaranteed.
More formally, a system P satisfies property GNDCα

if the behavior of P , despite the presence of a
hostile environment X that can interact with P only through a fixed set of channels C, appears to be same
(w.r.t. a behavioral relation  of observational equivalence) to the behavior of a modified version α of P
that represents the expected (correct) behavior of P . As behavioral relation between processes we consider
hereafter the trace inclusion relation ≤trace (App. A).
The formula expressing the GNDC schema is as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given a behavioral relation  between processes,  : P → P, a function α between
processes, α : P → P, and a set EφXC of all the admissible hostile processes, (App. B), we say that a process
P ∈ GNDCα

⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ EφXC : (P ||X) \ C  α(P ).
Basically, what we are going to do in the following subsections is, for each protocol: 1) first, to define,
as a Crypto-CCS process, the correct behaviour that the system P should have with respect to the security
property to be investigated (e.g., in the next subsection, αint will denote the correct behaviour of EMSS with
respect to integrity); 2) then, to verify that the behaviour of system P , when considering just one sender
plus the intruder and one receiver plus the intruder, is included in the defined correct behaviour (this is
done accordingly to the GNDC theory); 3) finally, to exploit compositional principles in order to assert the
validity of the property within the whole system.
A compositional principle (in its untimed version) is the following:
Definition 3.2. Stability of a process. We say that a process P is stable w.r.t. φX if, whenever
(P ||XφX ) \ C
γ
=⇒ (P ′||X ′φ′
X
) \ C, then D(φX) = D(φ
′
X).
This was introduced in [GM04]. We denote the set of messages initially known by process X as φX .
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D(φ′X) is a set of messages representing what can be inferred by X at the end of a certain computation γ run
in parallel with process P , while D(φX) represents what can be inferred with φX solely. Basically, process
P is stable when X does not increase significantly φX during the execution of P .
When two (or more) processes are stable with respect to a certain knowledge φX , and they enjoy a certain
GNDC property, the following compositionality proposition holds, [GM04].
Proposition 3.3. Given φX and a set of public channels C, assume processes Pr ∈ GNDC
αr(Pr)
≤trace
with
1 ≤ r ≤ n and Pr stable w.r.t. φX . It follows that (P1|| . . . ||Pn) is stable w.r.t. φX and (P1|| . . . ||Pn) ∈
GNDC
α1(P1)||...||αn(Pn)
≤trace
.
Also, a timed version of GNDC, namely tGNDC, a timed version of the stability principle, [GMPV03b,
GM04], and a timed version of the proposition of compositionality of a GNDC property exist [GM04]. They
will be used in the analysis of µTESLA.
3.1. An analysis of the EMSS protocol: integrity
The specification of the (1,2) EMSS has been given in Subsection 2.2.1. Here, we perform a protocol analysis
for verifying the integrity of the packets received by the receiver process.
Integrity for EMSS is defined within the GNDC schema as the ability to accept only the message mi
by a receiver as the i-th message sent by the sender (assuming mi is not lost, that is of course a necessary
condition for its verifiability). Let us assume that a receiver signals the acceptance of a stream of messages
as a legitimate one, by issuing it, as a unique list of messages, on a special channel capp. Thus, let αint be
the Crypto-CCS process Specsign =
∑
s∈streams capp!s.0, where streams is the set of all the possible ordered
sub streams of m0 . . .mlast.
Definition 3.4. A system P , consisting of a sender of a stream of messages {mi} and a receiver, enjoys the
integrity property whenever P ∈ GNDCαint≤trace .
Basically, integrity holds when the receiver accepts exactly a subset of the messages mi in the correct
order even in presence of an adversary. The key point is that the intruder will never acquire the private key
of the sender to successfully sign the final packet of the stream.
In a multi-receiver setting with one sender, a protocol guarantees integrity whenever each receiver accepts
only the stream of messages that the sender wishes to deliver. In our case, the specification for n receivers
is simply the parallel composition of αint n-times.
The first part of the analysis consist of verifying the stability of the involved sender and receiver processes.
S0, Rec0 are stable w.r.t. the following initial knowledge φX :
φX = {P0} ∪ {P1} ∪ {Pi | i = 2, . . . , last} ∪ {pk(S), Psign}
This can be proved by looking at the specifications of S0 and Rec0 given in Subsection 2.2.1.
The initial knowledge φX includes indeed all the messages an adversary would be able to add to its
knowledge by eavesdropping on a run of the protocol (in other words, X does not increase its knowledge
when S0 and Rec0 run). This implies that the considered intruder has the most powerful means to act
since the beginning of the computation. One may comment that this is not correct, since it does not follow
the reality. On the other hand, this is only a trick in the model, and, if the protocol satisfies the integrity
property in this very hostile environment, then it means that it will satisfy this property in a less powerful
one. This may be formally justified, [FM99]. Here, we prefer to give an informal discussion of the matter: let
us suppose that there exists a sequence of actions, leading to an attack w.r.t. a procedure, performed by an
intruder whose initial knowledge is φ. Then, let us suppose that the intruder knows φ′, with φ ⊆ φ′. Again,
there will be at least the attack found starting from φ. On the other hand, if no attack exists with φ′, one
may reasonably conclude that no attack will exist by starting from a subset φ of φ′.
Now, we check if the specifications of the sender and the receiver, separately, satisfy the integrity property.
We can prove that S0 enjoys GNDC
0
≤trace
and Rec0 enjoys GNDC
αint
≤trace
, that is to say that, for all X ∈ EφXC ,
we have (S0||X)\C ≤trace 0 and (Rec0||X)\C ≤trace αint. This may be done by finding a suitable weak
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simulation relation between (S0||X) \ C and 0, and between (Rec0||X) \ C and Specsign (∀X ∈ E
φX
C ),
respectively. (The easiest way is to prove the same with one check, by simply considering the top element
TopCφ , i.e., the most powerful intruder, see also Appendix B).
Let C = {csign} ∪ {ci | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} be the set of channels over which each element of set E
φX
C is able to
communicate.
The candidate weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the sender specifications is the
following:
RS = (((Si(...)||X)\C,0) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 0 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Ssign(...)||X)\C,0) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
The candidate weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the receiver specifications is the
following:
RR = (((Reci(xPi−1 , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 0 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Rec′i(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 0 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Rec′′i (xPi , xPi−1 , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 0 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Recsign(xPlast , xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec∗sign(xPsign , xPlast , xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec′sign(xver, xPlast , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec′′sign(xver, xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C,Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
tupi−1{mj}, tup
last
{mj}
are lists of meaningful payloads (also updated). By inspection of the possible cases we may
show that RS and RR are weak simulations. We omitted to explicitly put in RS and RR the pairs in which
the first process performs deduction constructs.
We give a sketch of the proof dealing with the receiver specification. When the first process performs
inference (or match) constructs and it gets stuck because an inference rule does not apply, or it simply
travels to the next state, it can be weakly simulated by whatever process, in particular Specsign. When Rec0
performs a receiving action, the process on the left may perform a τ action and it can be weakly simulated
by whatever process, in particular Specsign. The significant case is when the first process outputs a tuple
of messages tup{mj} over channel capp /∈ C. In this case, it must be {xver}sk(S) = Psign and, assuming that
digital signatures and hash functions cannot be forged, all the messages in tup{mj} must be replaced with
one of all the possible ordered sub streams of m0 . . .mlast. This can be weakly simulated by Specsign that
has been defined as the process sending all the possible ordered sub streams of m0 . . .mlast.
Each resulting pair consisting of the derivatives still belong to RR.
Proposition 3.5. S0 ∈ GNDC
0
≤trace and Rec0 ∈ GNDC
αint
≤trace.
The following proposition follows by the fact that S0, Rec0 are stable w.r.t. φX , by Proposition 3.3 and
Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.6. S0||Rec0 ∈ GNDC
αint
≤trace.
Then, the following statement holds because Proposition 3.3 is applicable once again.
Proposition 3.7. The (1,2) EMSS Protocol enjoys integrity for whatever number of receivers.
To check a system with an arbitrary number of components, what we do is simply consider the components
separately. The result follows by Proposition 3.3 where index r is not fixed a priori and P1 = S0 and
Pr, 2 ≤ r ≤ n is Rec0.
3.2. Hints to an analysis of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol: integrity
In [GMPV03a], the stability principle of Def. 3.2 and the compositionality proposition Prop. 3.3 have been
applied also to the Gennaro-Rohatgi scheme. The steps of the analysis are very similar to those presented
for the EMSS case study.
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The correct behaviour of the system was specified to be αint = Spec1 where Speci = couti !bi.Speci+1
with 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, and Specl = coutl !bl.0.
Sender0 and Receiver0, specified in Subsection 2.1, are stable with respect to the following initial knowl-
edge φ:
φ = {pk(S), b′0} ∪ {b
′
i, bi, h(b
′
i) | i = 1, . . . , l − 1} ∪ {b
′
l, bl}
Then, it is possible to find suitable weak simulation relations between (Sender0||X)\C and 0 and between
(Receiver0||X) \ C and Spec1, respectively.
Finally, one can apply Proposition 3.3 to prove integrity on whatever number of receivers.
3.3. An analysis of the µTESLA protocol: timed integrity
The specification of the µTESLA protocol has been given in Subsection 2.3. Here, we perform an analysis
of the protocol concerning one of its timed security properties. To do this, we use the timed version of the
GNDC scheme, namely tGNDC, App. B. The definition of tGNDC is similar to Def. 3.1, provided that one
could consider a timed behavioral relation between processes, timed functions between processes expressing
the expected correct behaviour and a set of timed admissible hostile processes.
So called timed integrity belongs to a new class of security properties defined in [GM04]. A stream
signature protocol guarantees timed integrity on a set of messages {mi} if, whenever the generic receiver
accepts an item in a time interval i, let us say item x, then x = mi−δ, i− δ being the time interval in which
x has been received. (δ = 1 in the formalization of µTESLA given in Subsection 2.3).
In µTESLA, let us assume that a receiver signals the acceptance of a payload as a legitimate one, by
issuing it on a special channel app.
Let P q
.
= Sj1||R
j,q
1 be the system consisting of a single sender and the q-th receiver in subgroup j, agreeing
on the commitment Kj0 . Thus, we define the correct behaviour of the system P
q to be the tCryptoSPA
process αtInt(P
q)
.
= tSpec1, where
tSpec1
.
= tick.tSpec2
tSpeci
.
= tick.tSpeci+1 + app(m
j
i−1).tick.tSpeci+1 i ≥ 2
In the first step, αtInt(P
q) simply lets time pass, while in further steps it may either let time pass (denoting
packet loss) or let a verified payload to be sent on the special channel app and then let time pass. The set of
all messages sent on channel app is the set of all the possible ordered substreams of {mji}i≥1. Let function
αjtInt(P
j)
.
= Π1≤q≤njαtInt(P
q), nj being the cardinality of the receivers in subgroup j.
Definition 3.8. The system P j
.
= Sj1||R
j,1
1 ||R
j,2
1 || . . . ||R
j,nj
1 , consisting of a sender of streamed data {m
j
i}
and the receivers in subgroup j enjoys the timed integrity property whenever P j ∈ tGNDC
α
j
tInt
(P j)
≤ttrace
.
Basically, it means that each receiver accepts exactly the messages belonging to {mji} in the correct
order and within the time interval following the one in which the sender actually sent the messages, even
in presence of an intruder (unless packets Pi are lost). The key point is that the intruder will never acquire
the shared keys KmSM to establish a secure channel over which the commitment K
j
0 to the key chain is
exchanged4.
For the analysis of timed security properties, we use a refined notion of stability, called time-dependent
stability [GMPV03b, GM04].
We let γ be a sequence of actions (possibly empty) ranging over Act\{τ}. Let #tick(γ) be the number of
occurrences of tick actions in the sequence γ.
Definition 3.9. We say that a process P is time-dependent stable w.r.t. the sequence of knowledges {φi}i≥0
if, whenever (P ||Xφ0)\C
γ
=⇒ (P ′||X ′φ′)\C and #
tick(γ) = i, then D(φ′) = D(φi).
4 We remind the reader that KmSM 6= K
n
SM if m 6= n and K
m
i 6= K
n
l
if m 6= n or i 6= l.
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The concept of time-dependent stability is similar to the one of stability introduced in Section 3. Basically,
a process P is time-dependent stable if process X cannot increase its knowledge when P runs in the space
of a time slot.
When two (or more) processes are t. d. stable with respect to a certain sequence of knowledges {φi}i>0,
and they enjoy a certain tGNDC property (Appendix B), the following compositionality proposition holds
(proofs in [GM04]).
Proposition 3.10. Given a sequence {φi}i>0 and a set of public channels C, assume Pr ∈ tGNDC
αr(Pr)
≤ttrace
with 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Assume also Pr t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i>0. It follows that
(P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn) ∈ tGNDC
α1(P1)||α2(P2)||...||αn(Pn)
≤ttrace
and (P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn) is t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i>0.
Sj1 and R
j,q
1 (Subsection 2.3.1) are time-dependent stable w.r.t. the sequence {φi} = φ1, φ2, φ3, . . . defined
as follows:
φ1 = {m
j
1,mac(m
j
1,K
j
1) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
φ2 = φ1 ∪ {m
j
2,mac(m
j
2,K
j
2),K
j
1 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
. . .
φi = φi−1 ∪ {m
j
i ,mac(m
j
i ,K
j
i ),K
j
i−1 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
. . .
where n is the number of senders. This can be verified by inspection of the specifications in Subsection 2.3.
φi is equal to φi−1 plus the set of all the messages an intruder would be able to add to its knowledge by
eavesdropping on a run of the protocol during the whole time interval i (of course including those messages
coming from all the other senders processes). The same considerations about the power of the intruder hold
as in the previous section. Actually, the intruder has more powerful means to act since the beginning of each
time interval.
Now we check if Sj1 and R
j,q
1 , specified in Subsection 2.3.1, separately satisfy the properties of interest.
Let 0′ be the process that simply lets time pass, 0′ = tick.0′. Then, Sj1 enjoys tGNDC
0
′
≤ttrace
and Rj,q1 enjoys
tGNDC
αtInt(P
q)
≤ttrace
, that is to say for all X ∈ tEφ1C we have (S
j
1||X)\C ≤ttrace 0
′ and (Rj,q1 ||X)\C ≤ttrace
αtInt(P
q). This may be proved by finding a suitable weak simulation relation between (Sj1||Xφ1) \C and 0
′
and between (Rj,q1 ||Xφ1) \ C and tSpec1, respectively. The set C of channels over which an intruder is able
to communicate is C = {ci | i > 0}.
Lemma 3.11. Sj1 and R
j,q
1 are t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}.
Lemma 3.12. Sj1 ∈ tGNDC
0
′
≤ttrace
and Rj,q1 ∈ tGNDC
αtInt(P
q)
≤ttrace
.
The proof of Lemma 3.12 is in the Appendix.
The following proposition follows by Lemmas 3.11 and 3.12 and by Proposition 3.10, where r = 1, 2,
P1 = S
j
1, P2 = R
j,q
1 .
Proposition 3.13. P q ∈ tGNDC
αtInt(P
q)
≤ttrace
5.
The correctness of the multiple receivers version (considering all the receivers belonging to subgroup j), can
be also proved using results of Lemmas 3.11 and 3.12 and Proposition 3.10, where index r is not fixed a
priori and P1 = S
j
1 and Pr = R
j,q
1 with 1 ≤ q ≤ nj .
Proposition 3.14. For the system P j of Definition 3.8, we have P j ∈ tGNDC
α
j
tInt
(P j)
≤ttrace
.
We get into the issue of considering a multiple senders/receivers environment. Let us consider Γ = Π1≤j≤nP
j
and αtInt(Γ) = Π1≤j≤nα
j
tInt(P
j), where n is the cardinality of the senders processes.
5 Note that 0′||αtInt(P
q) ≤ttrace αtInt(P
q).
Formal models and analysis of secure multicastin wired and wireless networks 21
Proposition 3.15. System Γ ∈ tGNDC
αtInt(Γ)
≤ttrace
.
The result follows by application of Propositions 3.10 and 3.14.
We note that, in order to have timed integrity on the messages mi, µTESLA must ensure timed secrecy
on the keys Ki. Indeed, we could also check explicitly timed secrecy on the keys with the same machinery.
3.4. An analysis of the N Root/Leaf pairwise keys protocol: secrecy
A secrecy analysis on the protocol presented in Section 2.4, with respect to an intruder that tries to discover
m, is achieved by exploiting the principle on the persistent stability of the parallel composition of stable
processes, introduced as part of Prop. 3.3. For the sake of clarity, we report this result as a stand-alone
lemma.
Lemma 3.16. Given an intruder’s initial knowledge φX , assume that P1 and P2 are stable processes w.r.t.
φX ; then P1||P2 is stable w.r.t. φX .
We informally motivate the guidelines of the analysis, before showing its steps. The intruder is provided
with an initial knowledge φX , that can be increased to the set φ
′
X during the execution of the protocol by
the messages the intruder process receives. Accordingly, the intruder’s knowledge becomes at most D(φ′X).
Thus, to carry out an analysis on the secrecy of messages, one can act in the following way. We must
analyze how the knowledge of the intruder is altered in the course of the protocol execution. If, by increasing
its knowledge, message m happens to be in that knowledge, this means that the intruder has discovered m.
In other words, there is a secrecy attack on the protocol.
Thus, let φX be the set {{K}KIL1 |{K}KIL2 | . . . |{K}KILN } ∪ {{m}K}.
One can easily check that the initiator process I1 is stable w.r.t. φX and each leaf process L
n
1 , with
1 ≤ n ≤ N , is stable w.r.t. φX . Let C be the set {c1, c2}.
During its computation, the initiator process performs only two output actions, whose corresponding
messages exactly correspond to φX . On the other hand, each leaf in the set of the receivers does not perform
any output action, thus not contributing to augmenting the initial knowledge φX .
By applying Lemma 3.16, one can conclude that process P
.
= I1||L
n
1 is stable w.r.t. φX , meaning that the
knowledge of the intruder does not significantly evolve during the computation of the protocol. In particular,
this means that the protocol preserves the secrecy of message m (given of course the initial confidentiality
of m and the correct choice and delivery of {KILn} and K).
4. Conclusions
Multicast and wireless security are a fertile field for computer science and engineering researchers and
developers. In this paper an attention was focused on methodologies for certifying the correctness of some
architectures for authenticating digital streams and giving them data confidentiality.
The modeling and the verification approaches have been presented through some case studies. In par-
ticular, the protocols’ models have been given by exploiting a process-algebraic framework dealing with
cryptographic and timed primitives. Also, the framework is rich enough to describe wireless communications
(at the level of details useful for our goals). The verification has been performed using appropriate methods
derived from usual process-algebras techniques, such as simulation checking. A key feature is the application
of compositional analysis techniques that allowed us to check systems even with an unbounded number of
participants.
The choice of the case studies involving the signature of digital streams has not been random. Indeed,
the first is considered a pioneering protocol in the field. However, it suffers from the problem of packet
loss, in the sense that, if a packet is missing, the authentication chain is broken and the integrity of the
subsequent packets cannot be verified. Several protocols were born with the intent of fighting against this
problem. In particular, we have chosen EMSS, in order to model also packet loss. We achieve it through a
non-deterministic choice performed at the receiver’s side. Finally, also timed issues in wireless environments
have been considered. To this aim, a process algebra enriched with timed primitives has been used, able to
model the passing of time.
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An analysis has been also conducted in order to prove that the multicast data are not modified en-route,
i.e., in their traveling from one sender to the set of receivers. To analyze this sort of robustness against packet
modification, also called integrity of packets, a compositional analysis has been applied. The methodology
can work both in a timed and in an untimed setting and, for some protocols, it has the advantage of carrying
out the analysis over an unbounded number of components.
In the timed case study, the fulfillment of the property of timed integrity is a consequence of the fulfillment
of the property of timed secrecy over the keys that are going to be disclosed. We could also have checked
explicitly timed secrecy over those keys, with the same proposed machinery. On the contrary, what has
been proposed here is a case study dealing with secure group communication. Whereas the modeling of the
protocol has been done within the same process-algebraic framework, another principle has been used for
the analysis. The aim of the analysis was checking the fulfillment of the secrecy of data exchanged within the
group’s members. To this aim, the property of secrecy has been mapped into a property over the intruder’s
knowledge, by checking how it changes during the computation. A possible extension to this kind of analysis
could be enlarging the scenario to protocols guaranteeing forward and backward secrecy in dynamic groups,
see, e.g., [WGL00].
To sum up, the number of protocols, the different scenarios and the properties we were able to deal
with suggest the feasibility of our verification approach. By starting from these results, we are also going to
develop techniques to automatize the proofs as well as a more precise modeling of wireless communication.
This could allow us to deal with other relevant properties such as denial of service, location-based security
properties (as privacy location) and similar issues.
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APPENDIX
A. Crypto-CCS and tCryptoSPA
This appendix presents a concise description of the Crypto-CCS and the tCryptoSPA syntax and semantics.
Some constructs of the languages are here omitted, since they are not of direct interest for the investigated
topics. For a complete description, the interested reader is invited to see [Mar03, GM04], respectively.
A.1. Crypto-CCS
The model of the language consists of sequential agents able to communicate by exchanging messages.
The data handling part of the language consists of messages and inference systems. Messages are the
data manipulated by agents, they form a set Msgs of terms possibly containing variables. The set Msgs is
defined by the grammar:
m ::= x | b | F 1(m1, . . . ,mk1) | . . . | F
l(m1, . . . ,mkl)
where F i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l) are the constructors for messages, x ∈ V is a countable set of variables, b ∈ B is
a collection of basic messages and ki, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, gives the number of arguments of the constructor F
i.
Messages without variables are closed messages.
Inference systems model the possible operations on messages. They consist of a set of rules r, e.g., :
r =
m1 . . . mn
m0
where {m1, . . . ,mn} is a set of premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the conclusion. An instance of the
application of rule r to closed messages mi is denoted as m1 . . . mn ⊢r m0. Given an inference system,
a deduction function D is defined such that, if φ is a finite set of closed messages, then D(φ) is the set of
closed messages that can be deduced starting from φ by applying instances of the rules in the system. The
syntax and semantics of Crypto-CCS are parametric with respect to a given inference system.
The control part of the language consists of compound systems, i.e., sequential agents running in parallel.
The language syntax is as follows:
Compound systems: S ::= (S1||S2) | S \ C | Aφ
Sequential agents: A ::= 0 | p.A | A1 +A2 | [m1 . . .mn ⊢r x]A1;A2
| [m = m′]A1;A2 | E(m1, . . . ,mn)
Prefix constructs: p ::= c!m | c?x
where m,m′,m1, . . . ,mn are closed messages or variables, x is a variable, c ∈ Ch (a finite set of channels),
φ is a finite set of closed messages, C is a subset of Ch.
0 is the process that does nothing.
p.A is the process that can perform an action according to the particular prefix construct p and then
behaves as A. In particular,
• c!m denotes a message m sent on channel c;
• c?x denotes the receiving of a message m on channel c. The received message replaces the variable x.
A1 +A2 represents the non deterministic choice between A and A1.
[m1 . . .mn ⊢r x]A1;A2 is the inference construct. If, by applying an instance of rule r, with premises
m1 . . .mn, a message m can be inferred, then the process behaves as A1 (where m replaces x), otherwise it
behaves as A2.
[m = m′]A1;A2 is the match construct, to check message equality. If m = m
′ then the system behaves
as A1, otherwise it behaves as A2.
A compound system S1||S2 denotes the parallel execution of S1 and S2. S1||S2 performs an action p if
one of its sub-components performs p. A synchronization, or internal action, denoted by τ , may take place
whenever S1 and S2 are able to perform two complementary actions, i.e., send-receive actions on the same
channel.
A compound system S \ C allows only visible actions whose channels are not in C. (Internal action τ
being the invisible action).
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(!)
(c!m.A)φ
c!m
−→ (A)φ
(?)
m ∈Msgs
(c?x.A)φ
c?m
−→ (A[m/x])φ∪{m}
(D)
m1 . . .mn ⊢r m (A[m/x])φ∪{m}
a
−→ (A′)φ′
([m1 . . .mn ⊢r x]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
(||1)
S
a
−→ S′
S||S1
a
−→ S′||S1
(||2)
S
c!m
−→ S′ S1
c?m
−→ S′1
S||S1
τ
−→ S′||S′1
(\1)
S
c!m
−→ S′ c /∈ L
S \ L
c!m
−→ S′ \ L
(+2)
S
a
−→ S′
S + S1
a
−→ S′
(D1)
6 ∃m s.t. m1 . . .mn ⊢r m (A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
([m1 . . .mn ⊢r x]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
(=)
m = m′ (A)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
([m = m′]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′)φ′
(=1)
m 6= m′ (A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
([m = m′]A;A1)φ
a
−→ (A′1)φ′
(Const)
E(x1, . . . , xn) =def A A[m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ A1
E(m1, . . . ,mn)
a
−→ A1
Fig. 5. Operational semantics of Crypto-CCS.
The term Aφ is a single sequential agent whose knowledge, i.e., the set of messages which occur in its
term, is described by φ. The knowledge of an agent increases either when it receives messages (see rule (?)
in Fig. 5) or it infers new messages from the messages it knows (see rule D in Fig. 5). For every sequential
agent Aφ, it is required that all the closed messages that appear in Aφ belong to its knowledge φ.
The activities of the agents are described by the actions that they can perform. The set Act of actions
which may be performed by a compound system ranges over by a and it is defined as: Act = {c?m, c!m, τ |
c ∈ C,m ∈ Msgs,m closed}. P is the set of all the Crypto-CCS closed terms (i.e., with no free variables).
sort(P) is the set of all the channels that syntactically occur in the term P.
The operational semantics of a Crypto-CCS term is described by means of the labeled transition system
(lts, for short) 〈P, Act, {
a
−→}a∈Act〉, where {
a
−→}a∈Act is the least relation between Crypto-CCS processes
induced by the axioms and inference rules of Fig. 5 (in that figure the symmetric rules for ||1, ||2, \1,+2 are
omitted).
The expression S
a
−→ S′ means that the system can move from the state S to the state S′ through the
action a. The expression S =⇒ S′ denotes that S and S′ belong to the reflexive and transitive closure of
τ
−→; let γ = a1 . . . an ∈ (Act\{τ})
∗ be a sequence of actions. Then, S
γ
=⇒ S′ if S =⇒
a1−→=⇒ . . . =⇒
an−→
=⇒ S′.
As behavioral relations among Crypto-CCS terms, we are interested in trace inclusion (equivalence) and
(weak) simulation.
Definition A.1. We say that the traces of P are included in the traces of Q (P ≤trace Q) whenever, if
P
γ
=⇒ P1 then Q
γ
=⇒ Q1. We write that P=traceQ iff P ≤trace Q and Q ≤trace P .
Definition A.2. We say that a relation R among processes is a weak simulation, if for every (P,Q) ∈ R
we have:
• If P
a
−→ P ′, a 6= τ , then there exists Q′ s.t. Q
a
=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
• If P
τ
−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ s.t. Q =⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
The union of all weak simulations is a weak simulation and it is denoted by ≺. As usual, it holds that if
P ≺ Q then P ≤trace Q.
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A.2. tCryptoSPA
The timed extension of the Cryptographic Security Process Algebra (for short, CryptoSPA) of [FM99,
FGM00a] has been proposed in [GM04]. The new language, timedCryptoSPA (tCryptoSPA for short),
is adopted for describing cryptographic protocols where information about the concrete timing of events is
necessary. We remind the reader of the syntax, the operational semantics of the language and some auxiliary
notions. The description is not exhaustive, since some constructs are not of direct interest for the investigated
topics. Furthermore, some terms of the language are the same as in the Crypto-CCS language. Finally, the
interested reader is referred to [GM04] for a more complete discussion of tCryptoSPA.
The set L of tCryptoSPA processes is defined as:
P ::= 0| c(x).P | cm.P | τ.P | tick.P | P1 + P2 | P1||P2 | P\L |
A(m1, . . . ,mn) | [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 ⊢rule x]P1;P2
We omit to describe terms whose meaning has been already explained in the previous part of the ap-
pendix, section A.1. To this aim, note that the tCryptoSPA sequential construct cm.P is syntactically and
semantically equivalent to the Crypto-CCS sequential construct c!m.P . Thus, cm.P is the process that can
send m on channel c, then behaving like P .
m,m1, . . . ,mr,mn are messages or variables and L is a set of channels. Both the operators c(x).P and
[〈m1 . . .mr〉 ⊢rule x]P1;P2 bind the variable x in P and P1, respectively.
Let Def : Const −→ L be a set of defining equations of the form A(x1, . . . , xn)
.
= P , where P may
contain no free variables except x1, . . . , xn, which must be distinct. Constants permit us to define recursive
processes. A term P is closed with respect to Def if all the constants occurring in P are defined in Def
(and, recursively, for their defining terms). A term P is guarded w.r.t. Def if all the constants occurring in
P (and, recursively, for their defining terms) occur in a prefix context [Mil89].
The set Act of actions which may be performed by a system is defined as: Act = {c(m), cm, τ, tick, | c ∈
I, c ∈ O,m ∈ M,m closed}. τ is the internal, invisible action. tick is the special action used to model time
elapsing. We let l range over Act\{tick}. We call L the set of all the tCryptoSPA closed terms (i.e., with no
free variables) that are closed and guarded w.r.t. Def . We define sort(P) to be the set of all the channels
syntactically occurring in the term P .
τ.P is the process that executes the internal action τ and then behaves like P ;
tick.P is a process willing to let one time unit pass and then behaving as P ;
P1+P2 (choice) represents the nondeterministic choice between the two processes P1 and P2; with respect
to tick actions, time passes when both P1 and P2 are able to perform a tick action – and in such a case by
performing tick a configuration where both the derivatives of the summands can still be chosen is reached.
When only one of the two processes can perform tick, say P1, it could be either that P1 performs tick –
and in such a case P2 is discarded – or P2 performs its normal activity – and in such a case P1 is discarded;
moreover, τ prefixed summands have priority over tick prefixed summands;
P1||P2 (parallel) is the parallel composition of processes that can proceed in an asynchronous way but they
must synchronize on complementary actions to make a communication, represented by a τ . Both components
must agree on performing a tick action, and this can be done even if a communication is possible.
P\L allows only visible actions whose channels are not in L;
A(m1, . . . ,mn) behaves like the respective defining term P where all the variables x1, . . . , xn are replaced
by the messages m1, . . . ,mn.
The time model adopted in the language is known as the fictitious clock approach of, e.g., [HR95]. A
global clock is supposed to be updated whenever all the processes agree on this, by globally synchronizing
on the special action tick, representing the passing of a time unit. All the other actions are assumed to take
no time.
The expression P
a
⇒ P ′ is a shorthand for P (
τ
−→)∗P1
a
−→ P2(
τ
−→)∗P ′, a 6= τ , where (
τ
−→)∗ denotes a
(possibly empty) sequence of transitions labeled τ . The expression P ⇒ P ′ is a shorthand for P (
τ
−→)∗P ′.
Let γ = a1, . . . , an ∈ (Act\{τ})
∗ be a sequence of actions; then P
γ
⇒ P ′ iff there exist P1, . . . , Pn−1 ∈ P
such that P
a1⇒ P1
a2⇒, . . . , Pn−1
an⇒ P ′. Let 0′
.
= tick.0′.
For timed behavioural relations among tCryptoSPA processes, we will be mainly interested in timed
trace inclusions.
Definition A.3. For any P ∈ L the set T (P ) of timed traces associated with P is defined as follows
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(tick)
tick.P
tick
−→ P
(||1)
P1
l
−→ P ′1
P1||P2
l
−→ P ′1||P2
(||2)
P1
c(x)
−→ P ′1 P2
cm
−→ P ′2
P1||P2
τ
−→ P ′1||P
′
2
(||3)
P1
tick
−→ P ′1 P2
tick
−→ P ′2
P1||P2
tick
−→ P ′1||P
′
2
(+1)
P1
l
−→ P ′1
P1 + P2
l
−→ P ′1
(+2)
P1
tick
−→ P ′1 P2
tick
−→ P ′2
P1 + P2
tick
−→ P ′1 + P
′
2
(+3)
P1
tick
−→ P ′1 P2 6
tick
−→ P2 6
τ
−→
P1 + P2
tick
−→ P ′1
Fig. 6. Semantics of tCryptoSPA involving action tick.
T (P ) = {γ ∈ (Act\{τ})∗ | ∃P ′.P
γ
⇒ P ′ }. The timed trace pre-order, denoted by ≤ttrace, is defined as
follows: P ≤ttrace Q iff T (P ) ⊆ T (Q). P and Q are timed trace equivalent, denoted by P =ttrace Q, if
T (P ) = T (Q).
We define the concept of weak simulation as usual.
Definition A.4. We say that a relation R among processes is a weak simulation, if for every (P,Q) ∈ R we
have:
• If P
a
−→ P ′, a 6= τ , then there exists Q′ s.t. Q
a
=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
• If P
τ
−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ s.t. Q =⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
Let ≺ the union of all weak simulations among processes. Then, we have ≺⊆≤ttrace.
B. GNDC and tGNDC
In this appendix, we present the general schema Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC),
for the definition of security properties given in [FGM00a, FM99, FGM04], and its timed extension tGNDC
given in [GM04].
In the literature, several efforts have been made to prevent the unauthorized information flow in multilevel
computer systems [BP76], i.e. systems where processes and objects are bound to a specific security level. An
example from military jargon is the fact that documents are generally hierarchized from unclassified to top
secret. The seminal idea of non interference proposed in [GM82] aims at assuring that information can only
flow from low levels to higher ones. The first taxonomy of non-interference-like properties has been uniformly
defined and compared in [FG95] in the context of a CCS-like process algebra. In particular, processes in the
algebra were divided into high and low processes, according to the level of actions that they can perform.
To detect whether an incorrect information flow (i.e. from high to low) has occurred, a particular non-
interference-like property has been defined, the so-called Non Deducibility on Compositions (NDC). NDC
essentially says that a process is secure with respect to wrong information flows if its low behaviour in
isolation appears to be the same as its low behaviour when interacting with any high-level process. NDC can
be reformulated from the world of multilevel systems to the one of network security. See [FM99, FGM00b],
where the low-level process becomes a specification of a cryptographic communication protocol and the
behaviour of the protocol running in isolation is compared with that of the protocol running in parallel with
any possible adversary.
As a further step, a Generalized NDC (GNDC) has been formulated in [FM99], in order to encompass
in a uniform way many security properties. The main idea of GNDC is the following: a system P satisfies
property GNDCα

if the behavior of P , despite the presence of a hostile environmentX that can interact with
P only through a fixed set of channels C, appears to be same (w.r.t. a behavioral relation  of observational
equivalence) to the behavior of a modified version α(P ) of P that represents the expected (correct) behavior
of P .
The analysis of cryptographic protocols involves specifying a set of messages known by the adversary
at the beginning of the computation. This static (initial) knowledge of the hostile environment must be
bound to a specific set of messages. This limitation is needed to avoid a too strong hostile environment that
would be able to corrupt any secret (as it would know all cryptographic keys, etc.). Given an adversary
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X, we call ID(X) the set of closed messages that syntactically appear in X. This set, intuitively, contains
all the messages that are initially known by X. Let φX be a set of messages representing the static, initial
knowledge that we would like to give to X. We want ID(X) to be consistent with φX . This can be obtained
by requiring that all the messages in ID(X) are deducible from φX by means of the deduction function D.
The set EφXC of processes that can communicate on a subset of public channels C and have an initial
knowledge bound by φX can be therefore defined as follows:
EφXC = {X ∈ P | sort(X) ⊆ C and ID(X) ⊆ D(φX)}
We consider as hostile processes only the ones belonging to EφXC .
We define the property GNDCα

as follows:
Definition B.1. A process P is GNDCα

⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ EφXC : (P ||X) \ C  α(P ) where  : P → P is a
behavioral relation between processes and α : P → P is a function between processes.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth noticing that a slightly extended GNDC schema has been recently
defined in [FGM04], incorporating the fact that the set of bad behaviours of P may depend on P itself and
on the property under scrutiny.
For the analysis of safety properties it is enough to consider the trace inclusion relation ≤trace as behav-
ioral relation among the terms of the algebra. When the ≤trace relation is considered, there exists a sufficient
criterion for the static characterization, i.e., not involving the universal predicate ∀, of GNDCα

properties.
In the following, we give hints to the definition of GNDC without the need of the universal predicate, since
some notions will be useful in the rest of the paper. For further details about this static characterization, the
interested reader can see [FGM00a, FM99], where the following statements were first declared and proved.
Informally, the so called most powerful intruder in the trace setting ((TopCtrace)φ, hereafter, for short
TopCφ ) is that intruder whose knowledge is φ, that can communicate only over channels in C, that can
receive every message passing over these channels (increasing in such a way its knowledge) and, finally, that
can send over these channels every message that it can deduce starting from φ.
More formally, TopCφ is defined as follows in [FM99]:
Definition B.2.
TopCφ =
∑
c∈C
c(x).T opCφ∪{x} +
∑
c∈C,m∈D(φ)
cm.TopCφ
It has been proved, [FGM00a, FM99], that the general way in which TopφC is specified implies that its
behaviour includes that of any X belonging to the set EφXC of admissible hostile processes.
Corollary B.3. For every function α : P → P, a process P isGNDCα≤trace ⇐⇒ (P ||Top
C
φ )\C ≤trace α(P ).
The corollary implies that, for the analysis of safety properties in the trace setting, to check if a spec-
ification enjoys GNDC w.r.t. all the admissible hostile environments, it is sufficient to check if the same
specification enjoys GNDC with respect to the most powerful intruder TopφC .
By varying the parameter α, the GNDC schema can be used to define and verify many security properties—
among which secrecy, integrity, and entity authentication [FG95, FGM00a, FGM00b, FM99, GMPV03a,
MPV03]. As an example, we remind here how the secrecy and the entity authentication properties have been
formalized in [FGM00a] (relation  for specifying these properties is trace inclusion ≤trace).
The requirements for a secrecy property to be satisfied are quite intuitive: a certain message M, declared
to be secret, should not be learnt by unauthorized users. Thus, let us consider the event learnt(M), signaling
that M has been learnt by the hostile environment. Then, αS(P (m)) “is the set of processes where the event
learnt(M) can never occur”. For more details, the interested reader can see [FGM00b].
On the other hand, entity authentication “should allow the verification of an entity’s claimed identity, by
another entity” [FGM00a]. To formalize this action, the followed approach is the one proposed in [Low96] and
based on a so called correspondence between actions. Let us consider two users A and B, participating through
a protocol. To assure the property, one would like that, whenever A concludes the protocol apparently with
B, B has indeed executed the protocol. This can be tested with the introduction of two events, commit(A,B)
and run(B,A), representing the fact that A has indeed terminated the protocol apparently with B, (action
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commit), and B has indeed started communicating with A, (action run). To fulfill entity authentication
means to require that event commit(A,B) is always preceded by event run(B,A). In the GNDC definition,
αEA(P ) is the process where commit(A,B) is always preceded by run(B,A).
Along with GNDC, a general schema for the definition of timed security properties, called timed Gener-
alized Non Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC for short) has been proposed in [GM04].
Property tGNDC rephrases the analogue GNDC, but in a timed setting. A system S is tGNDCα

⇐⇒
for every enemy X the composition of the system with X satisfies the timed specification α(S). Basically,
tGNDC guarantees that the timed property α is satisfied, with respect to the  timed behavioral relation,
even when the system is composed with any possible adversary X.
We give here the set of admissible hostile environments for our timed setting. For a certain enemy X, we
call ID(X) the set of closed messages that syntactically appears in X, all the messages initially known by
X. Let φ0 be the initial knowledge we would like to give to the enemy at the beginning of the computation.
We require that all the messages in ID(X) are deducible from φ0. We consider as hostile processes only the
ones belonging to the set tEφ0C
6. They can communicate on a subset of public channels C and have an initial
knowledge bound by φ0:
tEφ0C = {X ∈ L | sort(X) ⊆ C and ID(X) ⊆ D(φ0)}
The property tGNDCα

is defined as follows:
Definition B.4. S is tGNDCα

⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ tEφ0C : (S||X)\C α(S) where  : L → L is a timed behavioral
relation between processes and α : L → L is a function between processes defining the property specification
for S as the process α(S).
As for the case of GNDC, it has been shown that,[GM04], for the analysis of safety properties in the
timed-trace setting, it is possible to prove the existence of a most general intruder (tTopCttrace)φ, acting as its
companion in the non timed setting. Moreover, (tTopCttrace)φ can let time pass, by performing tick actions.
Again, the timed traces of (tTopCttrace)φ include those of any X belonging to the set tE
φ0
C , [GM04].
Thus, the following corollary holds:
Corollary B.5. For every function α : L → L, a process S is tGNDCα≤ttrace ⇐⇒ (S||(tTop
C
ttrace)\C ≤ttrace
α(S).
C. Proofs
Lemma 3.12. Sj1 ∈ tGNDC
0
′
≤ttrace
and Rj,q1 ∈ tGNDC
αtInt(P
q)
≤ttrace
This may be proved by finding a suitable weak simulation relation between (Sj1||Xφ1) \ C and 0
′ and
between (Rj,q1 ||Xφ1) \ C and tSpec1, respectively. The set C of channels over which an intruder is able to
communicate is C = {ci | i > 0}.
The weak simulation relation for the sender specifications is the following:
RS = (((S
j
i (...)||Xφi)\C,0
′) | ∀i,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
∪(((Bji (...)||Xφi)\C,0
′) | ∀i,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
∪(((ciK
j
i−1.B
j
i (. . .)||Xφi)\C,0
′) | i > 1,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
The weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the receiver specifications is the following (super-
6 Actually, there is another constraint that imposes that the enemy must eventually let time pass. This is however not useful
for safety properties we are going to study in this paper and so it has been omitted for the sake of simplicity.
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script q is omitted for simplicity):
R = (((Rj1()||Xφ1)\C, tSpec1) | Xφ1 ∈ tE
φ1
C )
∪((tick.(Rj2()||Xφ1)\C, tSpec1) | Xφ1 ∈ tE
φ1
C )
∪(((Rji ()||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) | i ≥ 2,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
∪((tick.(Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi−1)\C, tSpeci−1) | i ≥ 2,Xφi−1 ∈ tE
φi−1
C )
∪(((Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) | i ≥ 2,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
∪(((Rj
′
i (yPi , yPi−1)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) | i ≥ 2,Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
∪((tick.(Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi−1)\C, tick.tSpeci) | i ≥ 2,Xφi−1 ∈ tE
φi−1
C )
We omitted to explicitly put in RS and R the pairs in which the first process performs deduction
constructs.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we omit to consider the cases in which the sender and the receiver by themselves
perform internal actions.
• Sj1 ∈ tGNDC
0
′
≤ttrace
. Let us consider relation RS . RS is a weak simulation:
– ((Sji ||Xφi)\C,0
′). Sji may
· either perform a tick action: in this case the whole system on the left performs tick and (Sji ||Xφi)\C
tick
−→
(Sji+1||Xφi+1)\C. 0
′ is able to simulate it and
((Sji+1||Xφi+1)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
· or go to intermediate state Bji . 0
′ is able to simulate it and
((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
– ((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0
′). Bji may perform a sending action, whereas Xφi synchronizes on that action: the
whole system performs τ . It may happen:
· (Bji ||Xφi)\C
τ
−→ (Bji ||Xφi)\C, i = 1. 0
′ is able to simulate it and ((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
· (Bji ||Xφi)\C
τ
−→ (ciK
j
i−1.B
j
i ||Xφi)\C, i > 1. 0
′ is able to simulate it and
((ciK
j
i−1.B
j
i ||Xφi)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
– ((ciK
j
i−1.Bi(. . .)||Xφi)\C,0
′). The process on the left may perform a τ action, i.e. (ciK
j
i−1.B
j
i (. . .)||Xφi)\C
τ
−→
(Bji (. . .)||Xφi)\C. Similar to the previous item.
• Rj,q1 ∈ tGNDC
αtInt(P
q)
≤ttrace
. Let us consider relation R. R is a weak simulation:
– ((Rj1()||Xφ1)\C, tSpec1).
· The first process may perform tick and go to (Rj2()||Xφ2)\C. Note that also tSpec1
tick
−→ tSpec2
and
((Rj2()||Xφ2)\C, tSpec2) ∈ R.
· If Rj1() performs a receiving action and Xφ1 the corresponding sending action (by sending messages
∈ D(φ1)), then
((Rj1()||Xφ1)\C
τ
−→ (tick.Rj2(yP1)||Xφ1), where yP1 could be either the authentic packet send by
the sender P1 or another one x1. Note that
((tick.Rj2(yP1)||Xφ1), tSpec1) ∈ R.
– (tick.(Rj2()||Xφ1)\C, tSpec1). The first process may only perform tick by reaching the configuration
(Rj2()||Xφ2)\C. Note that also tSpec1
tick
−→ tSpec2 and ((R
j
2()||Xφ2)\C, tSpec2) ∈ R.
– ((Rji ()||Xφi)\C, tSpeci).
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· IfRji () performs a receiving action andXφi the corresponding sending action, then ((R
j
i ()||Xφi)\C
τ
−→
(tick.Rji+1(yPi)||Xφi). Note that
((tick.Rji+1(yPi)||Xφi), tSpeci) ∈ R.
· If the first process performs tick, it reaches the configuration
(Rji+1()||Xφi+1)\C. Note that also tSpeci
tick
−→ tSpeci+1
and ((Rji+1()||Xφi+1)\C, tSpeci+1) ∈ R
– (tick.Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi−1\C, tSpeci−1). The first process may only perform a tick action reaching the con-
figuration (Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi−1)\C. Note that also tSpeci−1
tick
−→ tSpeci and ((R
j
i (yPi−1)||Xφi−1)\C, tSpeci)
∈ R.
– ((Rji (pi−1)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci).
· The first process may perform tick by reaching
{(Rji+1()||Xφi+1)\C. Note that also tSpeci
tick
−→ tSpeci+1 and
((Rji+1()||Xφi+1)\C, tSpeci+1) ∈ R.
· If Rji (yPi−1) performs a receiving action then
((Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi)\C
τ
−→ (Rj
′
i (ypi , yPi−1)||Xφi)\C.
Note that ((Rj
′
i (ypi , yPi−1)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) ∈ R.
– ((Rj
′
i (yPi , yPi−1)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci). The process on the left may either output a message over channel
app, or it may not.
· If Rj
′
i outputs a message over channel app, it must be z = ymac, yPi−1 = snd(ymac), xKi−1 = K
j
i−1
and fst(yPi−1) must be replaced withm
j
i−1.R
j′
i (yPi , yPi−1)||Xφi)\C
appm
j
i−1
−→ tick.Rji+1(yPi)||Xφi)\C
and tSpeci
appm
j
i−1
−→ tick.tSpeci+1. Both derivatives ∈ R.
· If Rj
′
i does not output anything over channel app, it is because the equality check among hashes
did not succeed. In this case, the system gets stuck. tSpeci is always able to simulate it.
– ((tick.Rji (yPi−1)||Xφi−1)\C, tick.tSpeci). Both processes may perform tick and the derivatives ∈ R.
